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Abstract: As market-based instruments (MBIs) become a buzzword, there is an emerging 
expectation among policy makers and natural resource managers that MBIs should be more widely 
adopted. However, without the change of existing ideas and institutions, governments tend to 
continue to use the default regulatory and voluntary instruments. This paper provides an overview 
of policy instruments and the general expectations about the instrument choice when governments 
face policy implementation. Although it does not provide specific choice of individual instruments, 
some key issues and opportunities are identified for the wide adoption of MBIs in South Australia 
for sustainable NRM and economic development. 
 
 
Keywords: Market-based instruments, Institutional capacity building, Policy instrument, Instrument 





















                                                 
◊ The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the South Australian Government or 
the Primary Industries and Resources South Australia. 
* Tel: +61 8 8226 0561; fax: +61 8 8226 0221; email address: shi.tian@saugov.sa.gov.au  
  11. Introduction 
As market-based instruments (MBIs) become a buzzword, there is an emerging expectation among 
policy makers and natural resource managers that MBIs should be more widely adopted. In Europe, 
the use of MBIs in environmental policy has gained ground substantially since the mid-1990s, 
especially in the areas of taxes, charges and tradable permits (European Environment Agency, 
2006). In Australia, MBIs for environmental issues and natural resource management (NRM) are 
relatively new. However, the opportunities to use competition and markets to address complex 
environmental concerns and NRM issues (e.g., biodiversity conservation, salinity, climate change, 
and water management) are widely explored.  
 
The Round One of the National MBIs Pilot Program has witnessed a significant increase in the 
experimental use and assessment of MBIs for NRM. The results indicate that MBIs can help 
achieve improved NRM outcomes at significantly lower cost than existing grants programs. MBIs 
also have the capacity to attract significant landholder engagement, encourage voluntary change and 
improve the potential to target public investment in NRM (Grafton, 2005).  
 
Natural resource and environmental management is a complex process. Different policy tools are 
required to address different problems, and different policy tools need corresponding institutional 
capacity building to support their implementation. Currently, there is an insufficient understanding 
of the integration between community, industry, NRM boards and government agencies in the 
institutional capacity to implement MBIs. 
 
Without appropriate institutional arrangements (broadly refer to the legal, political, and social 
norms, rules, and organizational structures) in place to facilitate change, people often revert to old 
ways of practice when incentives end, and therefore long-term NRM objectives may be 
compromised. Enhanced institutional arrangement and government-community capacity building is 
a key step to facilitate MBIs implementation for positive natural resource and environment 
management outcomes delivery.  
 
2. Policy instrument and policy implementation  
Due to the complex nature of the environment and natural resource management, no single policy 
instrument can provide a comprehensive solution. Government could apply a variety of instruments 
to address different policy problems. Table 1 provides a summary of ten types of policy 
instruments. According to Howlett and Ramesh (1995), these instruments can be classified into 
three categories: voluntary, mixed and compulsory instruments.  
 
Table 1. A summary of a spectrum of policy instruments 
Category Policy 
tool 























  Provide goods and 
services with no 
financial reward 
Expend their role either 
indirectly by cutting back 
on government services, or 






No cost to the government, 
unless it chooses to provide 
grants or subsidies  
Weak instrument to 
address economic 
problems; inequitable; 





























constraints have pressed to 
expand their role; 
expansion of the welfare 
state has gradually 




or political reasons 
Equitable, cost-efficient, 
flexible, quicker response than 
governmental organizations; 
promote community spirit, 
social solidarity, and 
participation 
Largely inapplicable to 
many economic and social 
problems; may become 
bureaucratic; not cost-
































Most important instrument, 
governments rely on 
extensively; often 
accompanied by other 
instruments (eg, regulation, 
subsidy) 
Self-interest  Effective and efficient in 
providing private goods 
Cannot adequately provide 
public or common pool 



































Does not offer rewards or 
impose sanctions; 
consultations between 
government officials and 
industry representatives 
become a new form of 
exhortation 
Help people make 
informed choices 
A good starting point if 
problems have no definite 
solutions; easy to change or 
abandon; inexpensive; consistent 
with the norms of liberal 
democracy  
A passive instrument, 










All forms of 
financial transfers 
to reward a desired 
activity (eg, taxi 
cab industry 
through 
regulations that fix 





grants (from government’s 
general tax revenues); tax 
incentive (no direct 
government expenditure); 
voucher increases the 
consumption of 
government desired goods 
and services; low interest 
rate loans  
Voucher allows 
relatively free 
choice in the 
marketplace 
Easier to establish if the 
preference between government 
and people coincides; flexible to 
administer (eg, tax incentives 
not constrained by fund 
availability and not need 
budgetary approval); encourage 
innovation; low cost in 
administering and enforcing; 
political acceptable (benefits are 
concentrated, costs are spread)  
Difficult to establish and 
need financing and 
legislative approval 
(except tax incentives); 
costly in gathering 
information; time-lag; may 
be redundant and causing a 
windfall; hard to eliminate; 





























by creating an 
artificial scarcity 
and enabling price 
mechanism to 
work 
A combination of 
regulation and market 
instruments 





Easy to establish; flexible to set 
the ceiling; restrict some 
resource use for those without 
alternatives; markets made 
decision according to the 
demand and (artificially limited) 
supply; raise revenue; certainty 
(only a fixed amount of 
undesired activity occurs) 
May cause speculation; 
high enforcement costs 
(eg, those cannot buy the 
rights forced to cheat); 
inequitable (eg, extra cost 
of buying right, allocate 
resource according to 







































Taxes often used 
as negative 
incentive (or 




commonly used to 
control negative 
externalities 
Uer charges are a 
combination of regulation 
and market instruments; 
governments set the charge 
(tax), market forces 
determine the target 
activity  
Imposed upon  Easy to establish; provide 
financial incentive to reduce 
undesired activity; user charges 
promote innovation (eg, search 
for cheaper alternatives); 
flexible; need less enforcement; 
raise government revenue  
Require vast information 
to set the correct level of 
taxes or charges; resources 
may be misallocated 
during the process; not 
effective in times of crises; 
not permit planning (as it 















Quite restrictive in 





some are laws, 
most are 
administrative 
edicts; govern the 
price and 
standards of vast 
goods and services 
we consume 
Government requires or 
prescribes certain activities 
or behaviour on the part of 
individuals and institutions 
through a continuing 
administrative process; 
economic regulations 
controlling price to correct 
perceived imbalances in 
market; social regulations 
focus on broader problems, 
cut across industries and 
agencies; environmental 
protection is a hybrid 
Failure to do so 
results in a penalty 
Require little information to 
establish; easier to prohibit 
undesired activity; 
administratively efficient and 
effective; allow coordination and 
planning; predicability and 
suitable for immediate response; 
politically appealing if want a 
quick and definite action 
Distort voluntary or private 
activities, promote 
economic inefficiencies 
(eg, restrictions on entry to 
and exit from industry 
reduce competition); 
inhibit innovation and 
technological progress (eg, 
no incentive to reduce the 
behaviour below the 
specified standard); 
inflexible (not consider 
individual circumstances, 
new technology requires a 

























some degree of 
public ownership 
(between a private 







A trend in public enterprise 
is to increase privatisation 
to prevent lose large 
money 
Governments have 
control or direct 
management 
Efficient economic policy tool 
(if no private sector produces 
relevant goods or services); 
require less information to 
establish; simple administrative 
arrangement; profits for public 
funds  
Difficult to exercise 
effective control over the 
company; inefficient in 
operation (no bankruptcy); 
monopolistic nature may 































Basic and most 
widely used 
instrument 
Directly perform the task 





Low information required to 
establish; enable capacity 
building; avoid problems with 
indirect provision; internalise 
transaction costs  





conscious (no competition) 
; delivery of programs may 
suffer from intra- and 
inter-agency conflicts  
Source: Derived from Howlett and Ramesh (1995). 
  3It is important to note that these instruments are descriptive rather than prescriptive, their actual 
selection and implementation depends on a variety of contextual factors. Policy instruments are the 
actual means that governments must select for implementing policies. To a great extent, policy 
implementation can be seen as a process of applying one or more policy instruments to policy 
problems.  
 
3. Policy instrument choice 
It is risky to call on an instrument from the repertoire before analysing fully the nature of the issue 
under investigation. A big task before the government is to select an instrument or combination of 
instruments that is most appropriate, effective and efficient for the task at hand, taking into accounts 
both the limitations and capacities of each category of instruments, as well as the political 
consequences of their implementation (Hoelett and Ramesh, 1995). As government options are 
limited by available instruments, knowledge about the range of choice is therefore essential (Hood, 
1986). An important trend in policy instrument choice is that when governments under pressure (eg, 
to restrain expenditure), “politicians prefer to employ the least coercive instruments possible” 
(Atkinson and Nigol, 1989, p. 111).  
 
Although a variety of instruments are available, the choice of specific policy instruments is a 
complex process. Social and political constraints favour the choice of some instruments and inhabit 
the choice of others. Factors that shape the choice of policy instruments may involve: 
•  Characteristics of instruments; 
•  Nature of the problem; 
•  Governments’ past experiences; 
•  Subjective preference of the decision makers;  
•  Cost of implementation and ongoing operation; and 
•  Likely reaction from affected social groups.  
 
3.1. An alternative classification of policy instruments 
Table 1 provides a summary of three categories and ten types of policy instruments. With further 
study, an alternative classification of these ten types of policy instruments can be made: 
•  Voluntary instruments (family and community, voluntary organizations); 
•  MBIs (markets, information and exhortation, subsidies, auction of property rights, tax and 
user charges, offsets); and 
•  Regulatory instruments (regulation, public enterprise, and direct provision). 
 
3.2. A model of instrument preferences 
Instrument choice is shaped by resource constraints, political pressures, legal realities, and the 
lessons leant from past instrument failures. In fact, it is a function of the nature of the governments’ 
goals and resources and the organization and capacity of targeted social actors (Hood, 1986). The 
tendency to choose a particular instrument is ultimately determined not only by state capacity but 
also by the level of policy complexity (see Figure 1).  
 
Policy Complexity   




















































  4Compared to voluntary and regulatory instruments, MBI is a highly contentious instrument, which 
is opposed by those who are likely to lose out from its operation, or do not understand the issues or 
operation. The model suggests that a high level of state capacity is required to use MBIs and 
regulatory instruments. This is the reason why institutional capacity building is so important for the 
adoption and implementation of MBIs (Shi, 2006). When the state is lacking in policy capacity, it 
will tend to use traditional regulatory instruments, or rely on existing voluntary instruments (see 
Table 2). Therefore, there is a need to analyse instruments in the context of the relationship existing 
between the government and the community.  
 
Table 2. Feature of individual policy instruments 
Policy instrument  Information 
requirement  Efficiency  Effective
ness  Equity Cost Organiza
tional 
Administ
rative  Flexibility  Enforc
ement 
Family & 












organization  L  H M-H  H  L-M  H L  H L 
Market 
  L-M H H  L  L  M-H  M H  M 
Information & 
exhortation  M-H L L  M  L  H  L-M  M  L 
Subsidy 
  M-H M  L-M  L-M  M-H  M  L  M-H  L 
Auction of 







charges  H M  L-M  L  L  M-H  H  H  L 
Regulations 
  L  H  H M  M H  H  L  H 
Public 













provision  L M-H  H  L-M  H  H  H L  L 
Note: H=high, M=medium, L=low 
 
4. Factors influence MBIs implementation  
There are a lot of factors that may facilitate or constrain implementation of MBIs. It is important to 
note that the success or failure of many MBIs often depends on the commitment and skills of those 
directly involved in the implementation process. Furthermore, institutional and socio-economic 
differences between regions may influence the applicability and adoption rates of particular NRM 
practices and MBIs. 
 
MBIs are constrained by limited institutional capacity (eg, under-funding, inexperience, unclear 
jurisdiction, or lack of political will) to effectively implement them (Scott et al., 1995). This is a 
universal problem that needs to be addressed. As NRM and environmental issues became 
institutionalized (in some form) within multiple public sector ministries or departments, this could 
result in substantial duplication of effort and uncertainty in jurisdictions. A challenge has therefore 
involved a form of “rationalization” spelling out clear NRM and environmental policy objectives 
and concomitant institutional reforms that involved more than one institution in the entire 
management process. In essence, the goal of rationalization and reform is to re-establish institutions 
that are themselves sustainable to support MBIs implementation. 
 
To be effective, instruments should be compatible with exiting or proposed legislation, institutional 
frameworks and administrative structures. Jurisdictional constraints may affect the design and 
performance of MBIs. Particular difficulties may be experienced in coordinating instruments at 
different levels of governments. In a federal system, policy instruments differ across jurisdictions. 
The federal division of power is a major constraint on selection of policy instruments in an 
Australian setting (Bridgman and Davis, 2004). In addition, there is weak integration between state 
and regional levels. These intra- and intergovernmental integration issues are often identified as 
serious institutional problems. Capacity building and information sharing were identified as key 
  5factors that promote intra- and intergovernmental integration and public participation, thereby 
helping to remove legal and administrative barriers and merge institutional strengths. 
 
5. Policy innovation  
The goal of NRM is to maximise the benefits through efficient allocation of resources. Determining 
an appropriate mix of policy instruments will be important tasks. When initiating a MBI program, 
legal and institutional settings must be considered where the regulations are to be implemented. A 
decision framework for selecting and assessing MBIs would help government to build up the 
capacity to facilitate the delivery of positive outcomes. As Bridgman and Davis (2004, p. 77) point 
out, “[p]olicy instruments need to be backed by sufficient authority and money, and chosen in a 
framework of rigorous thinking about ends as well as means.” Those tasks may include: 
•  Negotiating the pattern of future NRM practice and investment; 
•  Formulating a response to risks and uncertainties (eg, droughts and climate change); 
•  Efficient planning of new rural infrastructure; and  
•  Integration of MBI options with exiting regional socio-economic development plans. 
 
All will require a capacity for informed decision-making about instrument options, priorities and 
trade-offs in the government departments. The MBI approach can flow from either 'direct' or 
'indirect' government intervention. The key issue is to have a receptive or suitable environment in 
which MBIs can establish and operate. A “strong” MBI would allow market forces to determine the 
best way to meet a given standard or goal. Across all level of government, there is movement away 
from direct government action. A common feature is that governments choose to ‘contract out’ 
functions, relying on private providers who deliver services to a standard specified in a contract.  
 
 
Part I: Conduct capacity 
assessment via national survey
- Design MBIs that reflect & 
accommodate local needs 
- Change mind-set by improving 
understanding of MBIs 
- Increase community engagement 
& consultation 
- Design MBIs compatible with 
existing policy & practice 
- Conduct education & training 
programs 
- Understand community 
characteristics 
- Survey MBI participants’ attitude 
and perception change 
- Investigate landholder actions & 
feedback 
- Identify specific needs & 
institutional impediments 






Institutional Capacity Building as an Ongoing 
Process to Facilitate MBIs for NRM
Part II: Demonstrate capacity 

























Figure 2. Institutional capacity building to facilitate MBIs for NRM 
 
  6Success in implementing types of instruments will be achieved only if the community understand 
the functioning of instruments and the objectives that management agencies are attempting to meet. 
There may be inherent conflict between different interest groups, depending on the allocation of 
rights and responsibilities that different types of instruments bestow. Notions of fairness must be 
addressed as a prerequisite to any type of MBIs. To overcome problems of acceptability, the 
environmentally beneficial effects of MBIs must be demonstrated through public consultation and 
information programs (Bari, 2002). 
 
In order to maintain functional institutions and administrative processes to perform effective, 
efficient and sustainable NRM outcomes delivery, two parts of study need to be stressed in the 
institutional capacity building. Part I focuses on investigating people’s willingness and perceptions 
to participation, while Part II focuses on developing individual abilities and strengthening 
institutional capacities to facilitate the design, development, management and implementation of 
MBIs. Their relationship is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
6. Opportunities and recommendations 
A variety of MBIs could potentially be used to address NRM objectives, but the performance varies 
at different levels. Understanding the policy issue and context is crucial for the design and adoption 
of MBIs. Currently, many regions are constrained by a lack of information about why, where and 
how MBIs operate, their potential advantages and disadvantages, and how to integrate these 
instruments into regional policy toolkits. The main challenge is to design MBIs that can be 
successfully applied within the context of the same institutional and political barriers that are 
constraining the command and control approach. Meanwhile, MBIs often yield better results by 
harnessing the powerful cost-benefit motivations of businesses and individuals. 
 
It can be envisaged that the future development and implementation of MBIs will be challenged to 
be compatible between jurisdictions, but reflect regional variability in the level of capacity and the 
state of knowledge. From the state government perspective, potential opportunities associated with 
the development of MBIs may include:  
•  Improved knowledge on institutional capacity building; 
•  Building the capacity to implement MBIs in SA; and 
•  Increasing the potential for future MBIs adoption as a policy option by NRM Boards. 
 
Accordingly, there are some recommendations for the adoption and implementation of MBIs in SA: 
•  Identify gaps and opportunities for the application of MBIs at a local and landscape scale in 
SA (legislation, policies, information, initiatives, funding opportunities, processes);  
•  Facilitate and exchange of information across the Inter-Agency Group and the broad 
community that support groups to better understand/access knowledge and experiences of 
MBIs across SA; and 
•  Develop a register of expertise and identify mechanisms to access expertise from SA, 
Australia and overseas. 
 
Key elements that need to consider include: 
•  Set quantitative targets and standards for NRM, particularly for salinity and water quality; 
•  Capacity building for communities  and landholders to develop and implement MBIs, 
together with the provision of technical and scientific support and engineering innovations; 
•  An improved governance framework to secure the governmnent investments and 
community participation in the long term; 
•  Articulated roles for the government and the community to provide an effective, integrated 
and coherent framework to deliver and monitor implementation of the MBI projects; and 
•  A public communication program to support widespread understanding of all aspects of the 
MBIs policy so as to promote behavioural change and community support. 
  7Past experience has shown that the chances of achieving long-term institutional sustainability 
increase if three conditions are met: 
•  Flexible in institutional structures and mandates to deal with changing circumstances, this is 
best achieved by relying on existing capacity and mechanisms;  
•  Mechanisms available that provide for adequate financing of these institutions, this is best 
achieved through making the institutions cost-effective and through providing them with 
some form of long-term self-financing; and 
•  Initial development focus on areas where early successes are likely to occur, this is achieved 
through phasing development of institutional capacity and through outlining high-priority 
targets for intervention. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper provides an overview of policy instruments and the general expectations about the 
instrument choice when governments face policy implementation. It does not provide specific 
choice of individual instruments as this is largely shaped by political factors related to state capacity 
and policy complexity. Without the change of existing ideas and institutions, governments tend to in 
favour of continuing to use their default regulatory and voluntary instruments. As a result, the 
relatively newly introduced MBIs are increasingly being challenged to gaining ground between 
government and community. 
 
Institutional capacity building is essential that it not only helps people change their practice and 
attitude through MBIs implementation but also facilitates organizations understand and deal with 
landholder development needs and NRM issues in a broad context and in a sustainable manner. The 
scope of MBIs must match regions’ institutional capacity to implement them. It is arguable that 
some MBIs in the Round One of the National MBI Pilot Program were pushed too hard and too fast in 
some regions that were institutionally unprepared to implement them. In this regard, MBI approaches 
that introduce gradual and flexible reforms are therefore more likely to succeed within the current 
regional context of ongoing institutional changes. 
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